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Abstract
According to Jerry Fodor, there are two possibilities with respect to the origin of 
concepts: a concept is either innate, or it is acquired from experience by means of 
the process of ‘concept learning.’ Fodor’s view in his 1975 and 1980 is that the 
empiricist method of concept acquisition, forming and testing hypotheses about 
objects that fall under a concept, can only work for complex concepts. He claims 
that we must possess some concepts in order to form hypotheses, so none of 
our simple (or primitive) concepts can be learned. If we have them—then they 
must be innate. In his 2008 Fodor contends furthermore that no new concepts 
at all, neither primitive, nor complex, can be learned, and so that all concepts 
must be innate. I argue that Fodor’s famous mad-dog concept nativism should 
be rejected because it could only work together with what I call neural nativism, 
and the latter turns out to be scientifically untenable. In addition, I suggest that 
one’s position in the empiricism/nativism debate should be a function of one’s 
account of the architecture of the mind, which, in Fodor’s case, only implies 
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architectural nativism, and so, the existence of innate mechanisms. It neither 
obviously requires, nor precludes, representational—or concept—nativism.
Keywords: Fodor, concepts, concept acquisition, concept nativism, 
architecture of the mind
1.  Introduction
Is the human cognitive endowment innate? And in particular, do we have 
innate concepts? According to Jerry Fodor,1 there are two possibilities with 
respect to the origin of concepts: a concept is either innate or it is acquired 
from experience by means of the process of ‘concept learning.’ Since, as 
Fodor argues, it turns out that no new (primitive) concepts can be learned, 
we must conclude that all (primitive) concepts are innate.2 
This is Fodor’s famous ‘mad-dog’ concept nativism,3 a view that not 
many philosophers find plausible, but few dare to attack (cf. Cowie 1998, 
p. 227). I argue that Fodor’s radical nativism about concepts should be 
rejected based on neurological evidence. I also show that the reason why 
Fodor ends up a concept nativist is that he assumes that if a trait is not learned, 
then it must be triggered, and that it can be triggered only if it is innate. 
Once we reject the latter unsupported assumption, and provide a plausible 
definition of innateness, it turns out that Fodor himself has no reason to hold 
on to his radical nativism about concepts. 
2.  Concepts and concept acquisition according to Fodor
According to Fodor, a subject is said to have a concept C if she is able to think 
about something as (a) C (if she can bring the property C before her mind; 
cf. Fodor 2008, p. 138). Concepts, for Fodor, are thought-parts. They are 
mental entities (species of representations) that are constituents of cognitive 
mental states, i.e., of propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, thoughts 
1 My main sources are Fodor’s (1975; 1981; 1998 and 2008). 
2 As I explain below, in his 2008 Fodor concludes that no new concept at all, neither 
primitive, nor complex, can be learned, and so that all concepts must be innate.
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and the like (Fodor 1998, p. 6, and 2000, pp. 14–15). Lexical concepts, such 
as DOG (or GREEN, or BACHELOR), are expressible by morphologically 
simple predicate terms. Some lexical concepts are primitive: they do not have 
an internal structure and cannot be decomposed into other concepts.4 The set 
of primitive lexical concepts of any natural language is finite (cf. Fodor1981, 
p. 261). Phrasal concepts, such as the concept LIVES IN CHICAGO AND 
EATS MANGLEWORTS, are expressible by morphologically complex 
predicate terms. 
The semantic properties of phrasal concepts depend on the semantic 
properties of lexical concepts (the latter are constituents of the former). 
Phrasal concepts are acquired by the application of the recursive constructive 
procedures to primitive lexical concepts (there are, thus, infinitely many 
phrasal concepts). Lexical concepts, according to Fodor, either are acquired 
as a result of what is called the process of concept learning, or they are innate 
and only triggered by experience.
Concept learning vs. triggering
Concept learning is an epistemic process: it involves the formation of beliefs 
and the search for evidence. Fodor explains: 
the mechanisms of concept learning are realizations of some species 
of inductive logic. In particular, they involve the formulation and 
confirmation of hypotheses about the identity of the concept being 
learned. (Fodor 1981, p. 267; cf. also Fodor 1975, p. 42)
Each trial provides inductive evidence pro or con a hypothesis of the 
form: the concept being learned is the concept of something which 
is…, where what goes in the blank is a candidate specification of those 
properties of a stimulus in virtue of which it satisfies the concept. (Fodor 
1981, p. 268)
A crucial and distinguishing characteristic of concept learning, Fodor 
explains, is a rational connection between the concept and what it represents 
(Fodor 1981, p. 275). When a concept is acquired in a rational-causal way, 
“the experiences which eventuate in the availability of such a concept are 
4 See footnote 6 below. According to some interpretations, for Fodor all lexical concepts 
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held to bear a confirmation relation to some hypothesis which specifies 
the internal structure of the concept” (Fodor 1981, p. 272). In other words, 
in the case of those concepts which are learned, it is possible to provide 
an intentional description of the acquisition process and to show that the 
acquisition of the concept is rationally related to the experiences that gave 
rise to it, that it ‘makes sense’ in the light of those experiences. 
Concepts which are triggered are acquired not by learning, but by 
“opening one’s eyes and looking” (Fodor 1975, p. 97). All that is needed 
for the acquisition of a concept in this case is a properly functioning 
sensorium and the right kind of stimulus. As Fodor explains, “the structure 
of the sensorium is such that certain inputs trigger the availability of certain 
concepts” (Fodor 1981, p. 273). The connection between a concept and the 
experience that triggers it is brute-causal. The experiences of the organism 
do not stand in a confirmation relation to the concepts whose availability 
they occasion (Fodor 1981, p. 273), but rather they “function as the innately 
specified triggers” (Fodor 1981, p. 280). 
Standard Argument
In what he calls the Standard Argument,5 Fodor shows at first that it turns 
out to be impossible to learn any new primitive lexical concept by means 
of concept learning, and thus that all of our primitive concepts must be 
innate. Here is the gist of Fodor’s reasoning. Imagine that you are a subject 
in an experiment in which your task is to learn a new concept: FLURG. 
The experimenter shows you different cards with colored geometrical 
figures on them. You make guesses whether the card you see has a flurg on 
it or not. You make a first hypothesis: perhaps there is a flurg on a card with 
a yellow square. The experimenter gives a negative answer. Your hypothesis 
is disconfirmed. You hypothesize that flurg may be a green circle. This gets 
you a positive answer from the experimenter. The hypothesis is confirmed. 
Eventually you arrive at the right answer: a flurg is a figure that is either 
green or a triangle.
It is clear that you were able to complete the task only because you 
already had the two concepts, GREEN and TRIANGLE, at your disposal. 
But if that’s the case, then you did not learn any new primitive concept. The 
5 See Fodor (1998, p. 123ff; 1981, pp. 266–269).137 No more Mad-dog Concept Nativism
concepts you used to figure out what a flurg is were already there in your 
conceptual apparatus. You were able to successfully formulate and confirm 
the hypothesis that a flurg is something green or triangular because you 
already had both concepts GREEN and TRIANGLE. And so, it turns out 
that what is called ‘concept learning’ does not really refer to any process by 
means of which we would learn any new primitive concepts. Hypotheses 
can only be formed using some preexisting concepts. You cannot acquire 
DOG by forming hypotheses about dog-like objects because in order to form 
such hypotheses you would need to already have the very concept that you 
are supposed to learn (cf. Fodor 1981, pp. 269, 272). And since primitive 
concepts cannot be learned, they must be innate.6 
In his 1975 and 1998, Fodor states that by means of ‘concept learning’ 
it is possible to acquire complex (i.e., non-primitive) concepts. And so, even 
though a primitive concept RED cannot be learned because it is primitive, 
the concept FLURG (which means: GREEN OR TRIANGULAR) could 
be learned. FLURG cannot be identified with either of its constituents; 
GREEN and TRIANGULAR must be previously possessed, and FLURG 
can be learned as a construction from these two previously possessed basic 
concepts. In his 2008, however, Fodor notices that his argument works 
equally well for complex concepts, and so, that “the whole notion of concept 
learning is per se confused” (Fodor 2008, p. 130). As an illustration, Fodor 
considers the concept GREEN AND TRIANGULAR, and concludes that it 
cannot be learned by the method of hypothesis testing, because we would 
need to possess this very concept together with its constituents before making 
any hypotheses. The explanation of this fact appears already in his 1975, 
where Fodor says: 
The hypothesis whose acceptance is necessary and sufficient of learning 
[the concept] C is that C is that concept which satisfies the individuating 
conditions on Φ for some or other concept Φ. But, trivially, a concept that 
satisfies the conditions which individuate Φ is the concept Φ. It follows 
that no process which consists of confirming such a hypothesis could be 
6 Another element in Fodor’s argument for his mad-dog nativism is informational 
atomism, that is, a view according to which most, if not all, of our lexical concepts are 
primitive: they are atoms, unstructured symbols of the language of thought, carrying 
information about features of the world (see Fodor 1981 and 1998). I accept informational 
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the learning of a new concept (viz., a concept distinct from Φ). (Fodor 
1975, p. 95)
If this is true, then it also works against complex concepts. The individuating 
condition has to be a single condition. Even if there are different components, 
there has to be some one thing that assembles them into a condition for that 
concept. And so, Fodor concludes, “there can’t be any such thing as concept 
learning” (Fodor 2008, p. 139). (Notice that if Fodor really wanted to hold 
on to the view according to which ‘innate’ means ‘not learned,’ he would 
need to conclude that even the most complex phrasal concepts (such as the 
concept LIVES IN CHICAGO AND EATS MANGLEWORTS) must be 
innate. This would make his view even more implausible.)
The conclusion according to which the Standard Argument leads to 
a radical concept nativism is, however, too quick. All that Fodor’s argument 
shows is that the acquisition of concepts of any kind cannot be accounted for 
in terms of concept learning. Concepts, then, must be acquired in another way. 
This other way, for Fodor, consists in concepts being triggered by sensory 
experience. It is far from obvious, however, why triggering is supposed to 
require that concepts themselves are innate.
What we are dealing with here seems to be just a terminological matter. 
Fodor makes the assumption to the effect that either there is a rational 
connection between a concept and what it represents, or the concept is 
triggered. And then he simply defines the process of triggering as involving 
some innate items. He says, “you can only trigger a concept that’s there, 
genetically specified, waiting to be triggered” (Fodor 1998, p. 129). But why 
should we think that a concept can be triggered only if it is already there, in 
the innate endowment of the organism, waiting to be released by the right 
kind of stimulus? And also, what would it mean for concepts to be there, 
waiting to be triggered? Unfortunately, nowhere in Fodor’s writings do we 
find a satisfactory explanation of what triggering is really supposed to be 
or why it requires innate concepts.
The d/D problem
According to Fodor, the crucial feature of the triggering relation between 
primitive lexical concepts and their occasioning experiences is that it seems 
random (cf. Fodor 1980, p. 280). Looking at the experience that triggered 
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one, was acquired. This is what Fodor calls ‘the d/D problem’: we have 
no way to explain why it is experience with doorknobs, and not giraffes, 
that causes the concept DOORKNOB to be acquired. In concept learning, 
“the organism’s knowledge of its environment is exploited to confirm 
(or disconfirm) generalizations about the extensions of concepts” (Fodor 
1975, p. 94, footnote 28). On the other hand, “triggering stimuli may have an 
arbitrary relation to the structures they release” (Fodor 1975, p. 94, footnote 
28). In the case of triggering, Fodor emphasizes, the environment in fact 
provides a poor basis for the concepts that the organism acquires (Fodor 
1981, p. 280). The data sample from the environment is ‘fragmentary and 
impoverished,’ and it is just not sufficient to explain why a given concept 
is acquired. If the environment does not provide a sufficient explanation 
of how we acquire concepts, then, Fodor suggests, we should look for an 
explanation on the side of the organism. 
According to Fodor, what could solve the d/D problem is exactly 
the hypothesis testing method, a method which does guarantee that there 
is a reliable relationship between experiences and concepts that they 
cause. After all, doorknobs are certainly the best source of evidence for 
DOORKNOB. Unfortunately, as we have seen, concept learning is of no 
use when we want to explain acquisition of primitive concepts. In addition, 
we may question whether hypothesis testing is really immune to the d/D 
problem. Fodor holds that it remains unexplained why we get the concept 
DOORKNOB from experiences of doorknobs, and not from experiences 
of cats. But it seems that he should worry as well about why we form 
hypotheses about doorknobs, when perceiving doorknobs, and not when 
perceiving cats. The d/D problem, therefore, arises equally with hypothesis 
formation and triggering, and it cannot be taken to require concepts to be 
innate only in the latter case.
Fodor’s approach to nativism about concepts seems to be similar to 
that of Descartes. For Descartes, when we say that external things trigger in 
us sensory concepts (or sensory ‘ideas,’ in Descartes’s vocabulary), we do 
not mean that external things through the organs of sense actually transmit 
concepts into our heads. Rather, he suggests, what we mean is that they 
transmit “something which gave the mind occasion to form these ideas, by 
means of an innate faculty, at this time rather than at another.” From this 
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ideas [or concepts] of movements and figures are themselves innate 
in us. So much the more must the ideas of pain, color, sound and the 
like be innate, that our mind may, on the occasion of certain corporeal 
movements envisage these ideas (Descartes, “Notes Against a Certain 
Program”7).
What we see in this passage is a quick switch from an ‘innate faculty’ or 
mechanism to innate ideas. Neither Descartes nor Fodor seem to think that 
such a switch requires any kind of justification. Instead, both assume that if 
the mind comes up with concepts as a result of being stimulated by external 
objects, it must be the case that the concepts ‘were already there, waiting to 
be triggered.’ Innate mechanisms, however, do not necessarily imply innate 
concepts. Even though talking about the sensorium does not immediately 
provide us with an explanation of how sensory concepts are acquired, still, 
it is far from obvious that the mechanisms which allow us to obtain these 
concepts also require that concepts themselves be innate. 
Innate concept forming mechanisms vs. innate concepts
Even the empiricist idea of concept learning requires some amount of 
innateness. If we acquire any concepts by means of hypothesis formation 
and testing, then what is needed to account for that is an innate mechanism, 
an innate ‘machine’ for producing inductive inferences (see Fodor 1981, 
pp. 268–269 for what such a machine must include). In the case of primitive 
concepts, there also must be some innate mechanisms that realize the function 
from sensory stimuli to sensory concepts. In his 1998, Fodor actually notices 
that on the account he proposes:
All that needs to be innate for RED to be acquired is whatever the 
mechanisms are that determine that red things strike us as they do; which 
is to say that all that needs to be innate is the sensorium. 
And he continues:
The ‘innate sensorium’ model suggests that the question how much is 
innate in concept acquisition can be quite generally dissociated from the 
question whether any concepts are innate. The sensorium is innate by 
assumption …But …the innateness of the sensorium isn’t the innateness 
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of anything that has intentional content. Since the sensorium isn’t an 
idea, it is a fortiriori not an innate idea. So, strictly speaking, the innate 
sensorium model of the acquisition of RED doesn’t require that it, or 
any other concept, be innate. (Fodor 1998, p. 142)
Fodor clearly does not like this conclusion. Everybody agrees that the sensorium 
is innate, so what we have here is just a boring claim. Whether concepts are 
innate should not, however, be decided on a priori grounds. Rather, in order 
to determine what position in the nativism/empiricism debate is the most 
plausible we need to focus on what exactly we mean by the term innate (see 
below) and also on what account of concepts we endorse. 
3.  What is innate in cognition? 
The problems with assessing the plausibility of Fodor’s mad-dog concept 
nativism are exacerbated by a general lack of clarity with respect to the 
meaning of the term ‘innate.’ One may have the impression that the answer 
to the empiricism/nativism debate depends merely on what definition of 
nativism we accept. Say you like the idea of innate concepts. Well, you 
can go ahead and define ‘innate’ in such a way that concepts just must be 
innate. But then, why bother with the whole discussion? Let me clarify at 
this point that I do not intend to argue that Fodor should or should not be 
a concept nativist in some universal sense of ‘innate’ because, obviously, 
there is no such thing. My goal is more modest. What I want to show is that 
given Fodor’s account of concepts and his account of the architecture of the 
mind, and also given the definition of innateness I support, it does not make 
sense for Fodor to hold on to his mad-dog concept nativism.
First of all, it should be clear by now that, with respect to the present 
considerations, we are interested in what can be called developmental 
nativism. We are discussing theories concerning cognitive development, that 
is, theories about how human beings acquire concepts, develop their language 
skills, etc. We are not interested in issues concerning epistemological 
nativism and empiricism that refer to theories about how knowledge claims 
are to be justified.
Secondly, within developmental nativism, we distinguish between 
representational nativism and architectural nativism. Repre  senta  tional 
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some beliefs, some types of knowledge or some concepts) are innate. On this 
view, the mind possesses some pre-specified representational content, where 
different explanations are offered of the innateness or pre-specification of 
the mental representations in question (I talk about this below). Architectural 
nativism does not focus on the output of the cognitive process, or on the 
character or source of our representations. Rather, its center of attention 
is the process of cognition itself. Architectural nativism holds that there is 
an innate structure or an innate functioning of our minds. It says that the 
architecture of the mind is pre-specified. The mind is organized, at birth (or 
before birth), into some innate structures, and there are some innate ways 
in which information coming from the external world must be processed 
by the brain so that the process of cognition can take place. It is commonly 
assumed as obvious (by both empiricists and nativists) that some sort of 
architectural innateness is true.8
Fodor’s mad-dog nativism is an extreme version of representational 
innateness. Our main task at this point is, then, to figure out how 
representational nativism could be explained in more detail, and what exactly 
we mean when we talk about innate mental representations. Let us first look 
at various more general explanations of the term ‘innate.’ 
Meanings of the term ‘Innate’
On the most commonly known version of nativism, a feature is considered 
to be innate if it is possessed from birth (cf. Locke’s Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding). There are, however, many features considered to 
be innate (for instance, secondary sexual characteristics) that are not present 
at birth. In addition, it is possible that some traits that are present at birth 
were actually learned in utero (e.g., the newborn’s capacity to recognize 
certain smells or sounds). 
‘Innate’ may also be taken to mean something that is a priori to the 
operation of the senses, something that is not derived from the operation 
of the senses, but from the mind itself, or more generally, something that 
8 The empiricist tabula rasa metaphor is meant to indicate that the mind is originally 
empty of objects of thought (e.g., of ideas, concepts or knowledge). Empiricists do 
not deny that the mind is endowed with various natural faculties such as perception, 
understanding or memory, and with certain innate mental powers (e.g., abstraction or 
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is completely independent of sensation (cf. Tavuzzi 1987). An innate 
feature, on this interpretation, is also sometimes defined as “the product of 
interactions internal to the organism” (Elman 1996, p. 23). Fodor himself 
hints at this meaning of innateness when he considers whether ‘innate’ means 
‘not acquired’ (Fodor 2008, p. 132), or, more specifically, ‘not acquired in 
consequence of experience’ (Fodor 2008, p. 144), and also when he says 
that concepts are innate because they do not come from the environment, 
but rather from the organism (Fodor 1981, p. 280).
This definition of innateness, however, is also not very plausible. If it 
were accepted, it would turn out that there is really nothing innate because 
basically everything in the human development requires at least minimal 
interaction with the environment, and thus, also sensory experience. 
We would be inclined to think, for instance, that walking is an innate capacity 
of quadruped mammals. But walking is not independent of sensation, of some 
sort of physical circumstances (e.g., at least gravity and friction are needed), 
and of some kind of interaction between the organism and the environment 
(at least, the organism needs to breath, eat and drink in order to be able to 
ever acquire this innate feature).
Fodor’s explanation of innate traits as traits that are acquired by means 
of the brute-causal process of triggering avoids the problems faced by the 
first two explanations of innateness. A trait that is acquired by means of 
triggering does not have to be present at birth. Also, it is quite likely that the 
process of triggering involves interaction with the environment, and some 
kind of sensory experience. However, as we have seen, Fodor claims that 
‘innate’ is the only alternative to ‘learned,’ and that ‘learned’ is equivalent to 
‘acquired by means of hypothesis testing.’9 Such a claim has some obviously 
implausible consequences. If something is ‘innate’ just because it is ‘not 
acquired by means of hypothesis testing,’ then too many things (AIDS, for 
instance) would count as innate. Also, consider the scenario in which a person 
acquires knowledge of, say, Latin, by swallowing a special Latin-pill (the 
example comes from Fodor 1975 and 1981). We don’t want to say that the 
knowledge of Latin is innate. For Fodor, however, it would have to be so. 
The person’s knowledge of Latin is not acquired by means of hypothesis 
9 Hypothesis testing is the only rational cognitive or rational psychological process 
that Fodor considers as a possible way in which we acquire concepts.144 Justyna Japola-DesVergnes
testing, and so, it must have been triggered by the pill. If it was triggered, 
it means that it is innate: it had to already be there, waiting to be triggered.
A possible solution to the Latin pill problem would be to come up 
with an additional constraint on what it means to be innate. We could say, 
for instance, that a trait is innate if it satisfies the normalcy constraint, 
that is, if a given organism will acquire it ‘in the normal course of events.’ 
Our capacity to walk, then, is innate because it is successfully developed 
whenever a healthy baby is raised in normal circumstances. On the other 
hand, our knowledge of calculus is not innate, because it won’t be acquired 
unless special circumstances (learning in a classroom) take place, and it 
requires the employment of various psychological processes of teaching, 
learning, reading, studying, etc. The knowledge of Latin from the example 
above is not innate on this modified version of innateness because it is 
acquired in a very unusual way.
The concept of ‘normalcy,’ however, brings with itself its own 
problems. There may be cases when it is “the very abnormality of the 
conditions of acquisition that points to the innateness of capacities acquired” 
(Khalidi 2002, p. 256). So, for instance, if some species of birds are able to 
“develop adult song even when reared in isolation from conspecifics,” then 
this is “taken as evidence that birdsong in these species is innate” (Khalidi 
2002, p. 256). Also, the definition of innateness which refers to the normalcy 
condition would allow too many traits to count as innate. For instance, it 
would imply that getting colds is an innate property of humans. Normal 
conditions can and do change over time. In the modern world, being taught 
to read is pretty normal. So, because humans now learn to read in the normal 
course of development, reading would be considered an innate trait. 
The conclusion, therefore, is that the fact that a certain trait is always 
acquired in normal circumstances on its own does not say anything about 
whether the trait is innate or not. At the same time, it seems that any 
plausible definition of innateness has to take into consideration some kind 
of minimally understood ‘normal circumstances.’ This is because for any 
living organism there are various requirements that must be met so that it 
can function properly—without them, no traits, whether innate or not innate, 
can be acquired. 
Consideration of the normal course of events or normal circumstances, 
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takes us back to a biological understanding of innateness. This, I think, is 
the direction that we ought to take in our search for a plausible account of 
innateness. There are, however, many different senses in which the term 
‘innate’ is used in biological sciences. Biologists sometimes consider as 
innate the following:
  – traits that lack malleability (or that do not manifest developmental 
plasticity; traits that are hard to change, because they are insensitive 
to environmental changes);
  – traits that are characteristic of particular species (traits that are 
typical, universal or exclusive to a species; traits that reflect what 
it is to be an organism of a given kind);
  – traits that are evolutionary adaptations (that are the result of natural 
selection);
  – traits that are genetically determined;
  – traits that are unlearned; 
  – traits that develop in the absence of contact with conspecifics; 
  – traits (behaviors) that develop fully formed in animals that 
have been prevented from practicing them (cf. Griffiths 2002,   
pp. 72–74).
Unfortunately, there is no agreement on how to define these supposed 
characteristics of innate traits (e.g., it is far from clear how a trait which is 
genetically determined should be defined). In addition, it turns out that the 
listed characteristics do not pick out the same traits as innate. A feature may 
turn out to be innate in one of the senses, but not in another. For instance, 
a trait may be universal to all members of a species, but learned (e.g., there 
are birds that have innate song patterns, but in order to trigger these patterns 
it is required that the birds have contact with other members of the same 
species; Maclaurin 2002, p. 106). Or it may happen that some trait is a result 
of natural selection, but does require social interaction for its development 
(Griffiths 2002, p. 74). 
My suggestion is that a plausible definition of innateness should both 
acknowledge the scientific (i.e., biological) origins of the term ‘innate,’ and 
enable us to answer two questions about traits that are considered. First of 
all, it has to put limits on how an organism can end up possessing an innate 
trait in question. Secondly, an explanation is needed of why the organism has 
that trait in the first place. Answers to these two questions indicate certain 
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First question: How are innate traits acquired?
The answer to the first question will have several parts. First of all, we allow 
an innate trait to be acquired ‘in time.’ That is, for any given innate trait, 
there will always be a time t1 when the organism did not have it and another 
time t2 when it did. (The time t2 may occur still in the womb, at the moment 
of birth or at a later stage of development of the organism.) This way, we 
arrive at the first desideratum: 
Desideratum 1: An innate trait may fail to be present at birth.
Secondly, there will be some processes of acquisition, for instance learning 
(in the most common sense meaning of the term, as in learning calculus 
in school) or swallowing a second-language-pill, such that if a trait was 
acquired by means of them (and could not be acquired without them, 
excluding science fiction and other extraordinary circumstances), then it 
is certainly not innate. Acquiring French as a second language will count 
as an instance of learning; French as a second language is, therefore, not 
innate. (If French is acquired as a result of being hit in the head, it still 
does not count as innate.)
Desideratum 2: An innate trait is not learned.
Third, since all features in our phenotype depend basically on two things, 
our genetic makeup and the influence of environmental factors (it also 
depends on gene products, such as RNA and protein, and on different 
interactions between the genes and the environment), it makes sense 
to say that our innate traits are genetically determined (and genetically 
inherited) and require certain environmental factors. And so, we have two 
more desiderata:
Desideratum 3: The acquisition of an innate trait requires and depends 
on environmental factors.
Desideratum 4: An innate trait is a trait that is genetically determined 
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Innate traits are somehow coded in the genes (and genetically inherited)10 so 
that, in normal circumstances, all normally developing members of a given 
species are going to possess them (it is not unconditionally guaranteed that 
the organism will actually acquire a genetically determined trait; serious 
damage or a disease may prevent acquisition of the trait). In other words, 
a phenotypic trait is innate for a given genotype if it is sufficiently invariant 
(Samuels 2002, p. 242), that is to say, if it will emerge even if there are 
some (not too drastic) changes in the environment, and even if the organism 
itself undergoes some (again, not too drastic) changes. So, given the normal 
circumstances (not too rich, as in the calculus class, and not too impoverished, 
as in the case of a child being raised in complete isolation from other human 
beings), all the genetically inherited traits that are developed by normal 
members of a given population would count as innate.
A now obvious objection to this explanation of genetic determination 
is that it could still allow us to identify too many traits as innate. Most 
likely all normal adult human beings in a variety of environments have the 
belief, ‘water is wet.’ This belief is invariant and it must have some genetic 
foundations, but we would not want to say that it is innate. Samuels offers 
the following diagnosis of the problem:
The fundamental flaw to which all invariance accounts are subject is that 
they attempt to explain the central features of innateness solely in terms 
of a mapping relation between genotypic and phenotypic traits, without 
imposing any substantive constraints on the mechanisms or processes 
in virtue of which such mapping relations obtain. What they all ignore, 
in other words, is the question of what explains the existence of such 
invariant mappings. (Samuels 2002, p. 245)
My suggestion is that what can solve the problem is the explanation 
of why/in what sense a given trait is invariant. 
Second question: Why do we have innate traits?
Given that the greatest concern of the present considerations is the 
phenomenon of the human capacity to think by means of concepts, and that 
10 There is no agreement with respect to how a trait that is genetically determined 
should be defined. For more details, cf. Samuels (2004, pp. 137–138; Symons 1992, 
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the main question that we discuss is how concepts are acquired by human 
thinkers, what we need is a definition of a trait that is innate in a—in this 
case human—species. (For this reason, we do not consider as innate those 
traits that are produced by random mutations in an individual organism, 
and then inherited by its offspring.) In order to answer the question why an 
organism belonging to a given species has an innate trait that it does, we 
refer, in the end, to evolution. And so, we say: 
Desideratum 5: An innate trait is a result of natural selection; it is an 
evolutionary adaptation.11
To claim that a trait is an adaptation means:
to make a claim about the past: …[it] refers to something produced in 
the past by natural selection. …It is also to make a claim about design. 
…When one claims that a feature of an organism is an adaptation, ‘one 
is claiming not only that the feature was brought about by differential 
reproduction among alternative forms, but also that the relative 
advantage of the feature vis-à-vis its alternatives played a significant 
causal role in its production.’ Finally, given modern understandings of 
the genetical basis of reproduction, to claim that a trait is an adaptation 
is to make a certain kind of claim about genes. (Symons 1992, p. 140)
‘Evolutionary adaptations’ are not the same thing as ‘adaptive traits.’ 
Adaptations are those traits that are the result of natural selection; they occur 
through a combination of successive, small, random changes in traits and 
become fixed in a population by the selection of those variants which have 
the greatest survival chances. Adaptive traits are those traits which (now) 
increase the fitness of organisms that possess them. Some of the now adaptive 
traits, if they do increase survival chances (and if they are heritable), may 
in the future become fixed for a given population. Until they are fixed, they 
would not be considered innate. So, what traits are innate will change over 
time. Supposedly, there was a certain moment in the past when the capacity 
for language appeared as a result of just some random mutations. After that, 
this capacity turned out to be an adaptive trait—creatures endowed with 
language were more likely to reproduce. Now, for the last several thousands 
11 On my account, innate traits are not those features which have arisen from a random 
evolutionary force like statistical drift (cf. Pinker 1997, p. 36). Rather, they were produced 
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of years, language capacity can be considered an evolutionary adaptation,12 
an innate feature of human beings. It is also possible that a trait that is an 
evolutionary adaptation (and so, innate) currently does not have the same 
(or any) survival value for the species (it may not be an adaptive trait 
anymore). For a trait to stop being innate, it must disappear. (It is important 
to emphasize that whether a trait is an adaptation is an empirical matter. 
For this reason, we may expect not to know sometimes whether or to what 
degree a trait is innate.)
At this point, let us see how the proposed definition of innateness can 
be applied in the case of representational nativism. Next, we will clarify 
what it could mean to say that concepts are innate in the sense of being 
genetically inherited evolutionary adaptations. Finally, we will assess how 
plausible such a view is, and whether Fodor is indeed committed to it given 
his account of concepts and of the architecture of the mind.
4.  Kinds of Representational Nativism
What does it mean for mental representations, such as knowledge, beliefs 
or concepts, to be innate? In order to answer this question we need to 
distinguish two subcategories within representational innateness: tissue and 
organism nativism (cf. Samuels 1998, pp. 559f). Tissue nativism is a view 
according to which to say that there is innate knowledge is to claim that 
some representations are hard-wired into the brain, and that various neurons 
are “born ‘knowing’ what kinds of representations they are destined to take 
on” (the definition comes from Elman 1996, pp. 26–27). More generally, 
TN claims that in some cases it is innately specified that various groups 
of cells (in a normally developing organism) will take on some specific 
function. For instance, it may be that specific neurons in the cerebral cortex 
know in advance (perhaps even before they reach their destination when they 
migrate from the proliferation center, that is, from the place where they are 
born) that no matter what happens, they can and will be responsible only 
12 This definition of innateness indicates that different traits may be innate to a different 
degree. The longer a trait is an adaptation, the more innate it is. Language is less innate 
than, e.g., the functioning of the circulatory system, and other traits that the old parts of 
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for vision (this is equivalent to saying that on tissue nativism, innate traits 
lack developmental plasticity). 
Organism nativism is not concerned with features of various pieces 
of brain tissue. Rather, it is a thesis about whole organisms. It holds that: 
it is innately specified that organisms possess certain mental representa-
tions, … [that is,] there are some types of mental representations (e.g. 
the type [MOTHER] or RED), such that it’s innately specified that we 
all possess tokens of that type of representation. (Samuels 1998, p. 559)
According to organism nativism, beliefs (or concepts) that are innate for 
human beings are in some way genetically programmed to arise in our 
mind; i.e., innate representations are phenotypes that all humans (at least 
all those with similar enough genotypes, and those who develop in normal 
conditions) have in common. 
Samuels (1998) claims that contemporary theorists who defend 
nativism about representations, Fodor included, endorse organism nativism; 
they are “concerned with claims about what innate mental representations 
people (and other organisms) possess and not claims about the properties 
of specific pieces of neural tissue” (Samuels 1998, p. 560). We know that 
this is the case, Samuels points out, because pretty much everybody agrees 
that mental representations are multiply realizable, that is, that “tokens of 
the same type of psychological entity (state or process) can be realized by 
different kinds of neural entity (state or process)” (Samuels 1998, p. 560). 
And, according to Samuels, tissue representational nativism wants to deny 
multiple realizability.
Organism nativism, however, could not work as a general definition 
of nativism. There are many traits that all members of a given species will 
develop in normal conditions, but these traits do not have to be innate. Their 
invariance may be due to environmental invariance, they may not have been 
genetically transmitted and they may have nothing to do with survival value 
for the species. In addition, recall that the question we keep struggling with 
is whether concepts as thought-parts are innate. If we assume that organism 
nativism is true and that it is innately specified what concepts we are going 
to end up with, does this mean that concepts are innate? Well, first of all, 
if all that organism nativism says is that (1) the organism will acquire 
concepts (assuming it functions normally) and (2) what kind of concepts it 
acquires is determined by the kind of world in which it lives and the kind of 151 No more Mad-dog Concept Nativism
neurobiology it has (the kind of species it belongs to), then, clearly, Fodor is 
a nativist, but so is almost everybody else. Organism nativism with respect 
to various mental representations would be hard to refute. It does not seem 
very controversial to claim that it is an evolutionary adaptation that while all 
sheep (quickly) acquire the belief ‘wolves are dangerous,’ all human infants 
quickly acquire the beliefs ‘unsupported objects generally fall,’ or ‘the parts 
of the same object generally move together’ (cf. Fodor 2000, p. 93), and that 
ducks have the innate concept MOTHER that they apply to the first moving 
object that they see right after they have hatched out of an egg. As we shall 
see below, however, it is not very likely that what this requires is innate 
propositional knowledge, or innate thought-parts.
Neural nativism
My suggestion is that if we want to find a place for Fodor’s mad-dog nativism 
in the discussion about representational nativism, we will find it—contrary to 
Samuels’ claim—on the side of tissue nativism. We should notice, however, 
that there are in fact two distinct versions of tissue nativism. Consider the 
following two ways in which tissue nativism can be summarized:
 I.  Various neurons are ‘born knowing’ what kinds of representations 
they are destined to take on.
II.   Some representations are hard-wired into the brain; they are encoded 
in the brain as particular patterns of synaptic connectivity within 
a specific neural system. (Elman 1996, pp. 26–27)
The first description expresses the kind of tissue nativism presented above. 
It claims, as we have seen, that as a result of natural selection, specific pieces 
of tissue are genetically determined to take on certain functions, assuming 
that all goes well with a given creature’s development. The second claim 
expresses what I call neural nativism, and it defines mental representations 
as ‘fine-grained patterns of cortical activity, which depend on specific 
patterns of synaptic connectivity’ (Elman 1996, p. 364). It says that (at least) 
some mental representations are hard-wired into the brain; that is, they are 
in advance encoded as particular patterns of synaptic connectivity within 
a specific neural system (Elman 1996, p. 26) and in specific locations in the 
brain. According to neural nativism, those pre-specified neural structures 
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inherited by the individual and evolved in the species because there is an 
adaptive value such that the activation of a given neural pattern constitutes 
thinking a thought containing a specific thought-part, and so constitutes the 
occurrence of a given concept. Whenever a given neuronal structure fires 
up, the organism entertains a given representation. 
If what neural nativism describes is the actual state of affairs regarding 
the human possession of concepts, then this confirms Fodor’s mad-dog 
nativism. For Fodor’s nativism to be plausible, it would have to be the 
case that it is genetically determined and an evolutionary adaptation that 
for any kind of stimulus that a (human) cognizer can register, there are 
certain specific neuronal patterns in specific parts of the brain ‘waiting to 
be triggered’; any cognizable object will (and can only) be represented by 
some pre-specified neural structure, realized by particular patterns of neural 
activations in a specific location of the brain. On such an interpretation, 
Fodor’s position turns out to be: 
a type-type identity theory according to which every type of mental 
entity is identical with some type of neural entity—e.g. that being pain = 
C-fibre activity, being the concept RED = 30 MHz activity in the frontal 
cortex and so on. (Samuels 1998, pp. 561–562)
Neural nativism which would support Fodor’s mad-dog nativism claims that 
all primitive concepts that ever appear in our minds are innate, in the sense 
of being hard-wired. All those patterns of neuronal activity that constitute the 
thinking of primitive concepts are pre-specified: they are ready to fire prior 
to experience, they will fire when stimulated by the right kind of a trigger 
and they are assigned to specific parts of the brain. The exact character of 
every such pattern that represents any given object is genetically determined 
and fixed in advance by natural selection, independently of experience. 
What would science say?
How plausible, from a scientific point of view, is this kind of radical 
representational nativism? And what exactly can it mean for our genes to 
code for innate primitive mental representations? Consider what is called 
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when one cell repeatedly assists in firing another, the axon of the first 
cell develops synaptic knobs (or enlarges them if they already exist) in 
contact with the soma of the second cell. (Hebb 1949, p. 63)
As a result,
any two cells or systems of cells that are repeatedly active at the same 
time will tend to become ‘associated,’ so that activity in one facilitates 
activity in the other. (Hebb 1949, p. 70)
(The theory is often summarized as ‘cells that fire together, wire together.’)
For our genes to code for innate mental representations, it would 
mean that they determine, prior to experience, exactly what cells, in 
what configurations and in what parts of the brain, need to be excited to 
arouse a given concept. (If we were to distinguish different concepts at the 
neural level, we would need to be able to distinguish different patterns of 
excitations of different neural cells.) In order to make sense, such a view 
would also require the existence of a mechanism that would guarantee 
the right connection between a trigger (that is, the object that ends up 
being represented) and the pre-specified neural pattern ‘waiting’ in the 
brain—a neural pattern which, when activated, represents the object. We 
could say, perhaps, that at some point in the past, this connection used to 
be established as a result of experience. Perception of a given object would 
trigger certain cells in a specific location in the brain to start firing together. 
In agreement with the theory according to which cells that fire together, 
wire together, a new neural pattern would be formed. In order for mental 
representations to become innate, it would have to be the case, first of all, that 
possessing specific kinds of neural patterns is a heritable trait. In addition, it 
would have to be an adaptive trait for the organism to have it pre-specified 
independently of experience what concrete patterns of neural activation will 
stand for any given (primitive) mental representation. 
How plausible is such a view? While the issue is far from settled, neural 
nativism seems unlikely in light of current scientific evidence. What scientists 
can determine is which parts of the brain are (the most) active during various 
cognitive tasks (cf. Elman 1996, pp. 3–5). They have no way of saying, 
however, what exactly happens in the brain when I think ‘CAT’ (cf. Elman 
1996, p. 4; Merritt 2008, p. 184) and so there is no certainty whether any 
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What science does suggest is that specified localization is not sufficient 
for innateness, and that neither specified localization nor identity of neural 
patterns across individuals are necessary for innateness. So, first of all, it 
is not necessarily true that if a function is localized in specific regions of 
the brain, then it must be innate. Rather, it seems to be the case that various 
regions of the brain specialize only in virtue of experience.13 Also, it turns 
out that the same outcome “can be achieved in a number of ways, i.e., 
with different forms of cortical representation, and with the collaboration 
of several different brain regions, in several different working coalitions” 
(Elman 1996, p. 247). For instance, 
[b]rain organization for language and other higher cognitive functions 
may vary markedly across normal individuals, in idiosyncratic patterns 
that are as unique as their finger prints. (Elman 1996, p. 248)
There are no grounds for positing the existence of exactly the same neural 
patterns in the same parts of the brain that would correspond to the same 
concepts in different people. 
Finally, and most importantly, it is hard to imagine what evolutionary 
advantage there would be to have pre-specified neural patterns for each 
mental representation that the organism could entertain. Perhaps it would 
be plausible to claim that there are some innate (that is, fixed) patterns of 
synaptic connections in the brain that govern the functioning of the heart, 
of the circulatory system or of visual edge detectors. It would clearly be 
advantageous if the brain did not have to learn new patterns in order to 
guarantee the reliability with which the heart and the circulatory system work, 
and with which neurons in the visual cortex detect edges. Even here, however, 
the brain must acquire these patterns at a certain point in its development.14 
13 It turns out, for instance, that there is a specific region of the visual cortex that is 
responsible for spelling, which certainly is not an innate capacity (cf. Elman 1996, p. 
242). Similarly, various studies show that there are areas of the cortex “that are uniquely 
active” in “skilled chess players at different points across the course of the game” (Elman 
1996, p. 242). And chess playing is not an innate activity, either.
14 As Elman points out, “biologically plausible network models have been constructed 
which demonstrate that such specialized response properties do not have to be prespecified. 
They emerge naturally and inevitably from cells which are initially uncommitted, simply 
as a function of a simple learning rule and exposure to stimulation” (Elman 1996, p. 5). 
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With respect to conceptual mental representations15, it seems that the 
evolutionary advantage is the opposite: to have neurons, or neural networks, 
that are initially uncommitted, but which, when exposed to stimuli, learn 
various patterns to encode various representations. This solution may be 
costly with respect to the amount of time required for the acquisition of 
mental representations, but it allows for greater flexibility. There is no 
need to posit (very implausibly) any fixed-in-advance-by-natural-selection 
patterns of synaptic connections whose role it would be to represent, say, the 
concepts COMPUTER or RIPSTICK (a new kind of skateboard). Flexibility 
is what allows us to learn a basically infinite number of different concepts; 
also, because of it we are able to learn throughout our lives. Because of 
the brain’s flexibility with respect to mental representations, we are able to 
forget, or to get rid of, useless knowledge in order to make space for new 
knowledge. Improvement is also possible when some neural patterns get 
reinforced and other patterns disappear. This also puts a lesser burden on 
the genome. Genes are responsible for the complexity of the human brain, 
for the kinds and the number of neurons that we have at birth, for the initial 
connections between neurons, etc. There is no need for genes to also code 
for a specific neural pattern for every possible concept.16
At the brain level, to acquire an innate trait means to acquire a certain 
more or less complex set of neural patterns that is an evolutionary adaptation. 
In those cases where the possession of these specific patterns of synaptic 
connections is not an evolutionary adaptation, the traits that they are 
responsible for are not innate. (When I learn how to rollerblade and new 
patterns of synaptic connections are produced in my brain, the exact character 
of these patterns is certainly not pre-determined by natural selection.) 
What seems more likely is that it is the capacity to acquire concepts 
which is an evolutionary adaptation; but how particular concepts are realized 
very early in the development of the organism, and that they have a high level of priority 
in the allocation of neural resources.
15 I do not intend to take a stand concerning perceptual mental representations. It may 
well be that the basic representations involved in perception, such as edge and motion 
detectors, are evolutionary adaptations. If that is the case, nativism about basic perceptual 
categories could follow.
16 Cf. Elman (1996, p. 8): “There is simply too much plasticity in the development of 
higher organisms to ignore the critical effect of experience. …there aren’t enough genes 
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in the brain is not. The exact character of the new pattern that will stand 
for a given representation depends on various factors: the person’s genetic 
endowment, the stage in her development (or her age) at the moment 
when she acquires a given concept, the state of her brain at the moment of 
stimulation and a myriad of other factors from both external and internal 
environments. The new pattern most likely will not remain unchanged 
throughout the life of a given cognizer. If it is successful (if it turns out to 
be important and advantageous), it will get reinforced; if it is not successful, 
it will weaken, and the neurons involved in its occurrence will get hired for 
a new job.
5.  Conclusion
Among the various explanations of innateness that we have seen, it is 
neural nativism that provides a plausible and at the same time substantial 
explanation of what it could mean for concepts as thought-parts to be innate. 
Neural nativism, however, is not plausible from a scientific point of view. 
Given the current state of scientific research, we can also conclude that 
concepts understood as thought-parts are not innate. The remaining task is 
to show that Fodor himself has actually no reason to hold on to his mad-
dog nativism.
Implications of Fodor’s account of the architecture of the mind
The mind, according to Fodor, has three components—three kinds of 
cognitive systems: transducers, input systems and central processors.17 
Transducers are mental mechanisms that link the cognizing subject to the 
external world. They register information from the external environment 
(they receive physical, non-symbolic input such as light, sound, scent, etc.), 
and transform it into a format that can be understood and used by input 
systems, i.e., into neural signals, pieces of brain-code, or some patterns 
of nerve impulses in the brain (cf. Fodor 1983, p. 41). While the role of 
transducers is to specify “the distribution of stimulations at the ‘surfaces’ 
17 The main role of central processors is the fixation of belief. Central processors are not 
relevant for the issue of concept acquisition and so they may be ignored. For a detailed 
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(as it were) of the organism, input systems deliver representations that are 
most naturally interpreted as characterizing the arrangement of things in the 
world” (Fodor 1983, p. 42); they allow the subject to identify objects in its 
environment. On the basis of the information provided in symbolic form by 
the transducers, input systems—by means of computation—infer how the 
external world really is. As Fodor explains, 
[i]nput analyzers are inference-performing systems. …Specifically, the 
inferences at issue have as their ‘premises’ transduced representations 
of proximal stimulus configurations, and as their ‘conclusions’ 
representations of the character and distribution of distal objects. (Fodor 
1983, p. 42)
Together with transducers, input systems are responsible for “the realization 
of a function from stimuli onto primitive concepts” (Fodor 1981, p. 265).
On Fodor’s account, sensory experience, external stimulation and 
properly functioning transducers are necessary for the acquisition of sensory 
concepts. These are architectural constraints on sensation. Of course, the 
fact that transducers require external stimulation does not yet imply that 
(sensory) concepts are not innate. It may well be the case, and Fodor thinks 
it is the case, that the output produced by transducers only triggers concepts 
that are ‘already there.’ On the other hand, Fodor’s account of transducers 
does not indicate any need for innate concepts. Concepts themselves do not 
yet enter the stage at this point in the process of cognition. All that the theory 
of transducers says is that there must be mechanisms which will transform 
physical stimulation from the external world into neural signals. The 
character of a particular pattern of neural activations that appears at the 
output of transducers does not have to be pre-specified. It is rather determined 
(mostly) by the pattern or shape of the sensory excitation that causes it. And 
so, while Fodor’s doctrine of transducers implies architectural nativism, it 
neither obviously requires nor precludes representational nativism.
We find a more substantial nativist commitment in Fodor’s treatment of 
input systems. Each input system, for Fodor, is associated with a fixed neural 
architecture: “hardwired connections …facilitate the flow of information 
from one neural structure to another” (Fodor 1983, p. 98f). This is, again, 
architectural nativism. But then, Fodor also talks about input systems having 
‘knowledge’ and ‘beliefs,’ and ‘making inferences.’ Each input system, he 
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about its proprietary computational domain” (Fodor 2000, p. 1); “much 
of the information at the disposal of [input] systems is innately specified” 
(Fodor 1983, pp. 100–101). And so, Fodor states:
qua modularity theory, the kind of nativism we’re imagining …postulates 
features of innate cognitive content as well as features of innate cognitive 
architecture. (Fodor 2000, p. 91)
Input systems, according to Fodor, are useful in contributing to 
a creature’s fitness because the world in the end shapes what the mind 
believes. The beliefs that the mind holds to be true are shaped by experience; 
that is, they are formed by processes “that are sensitive to the way the world 
contingently is” (Fodor 2000, p. 95). If some among the beliefs that the mind 
holds were to be innate, they could be of any use only if they were true. And 
for this they would have to also have been shaped by experience. Based 
on this reasoning, Fodor infers that it only makes sense to assume that the 
innate beliefs in the input systems’ databases have been produced by natural 
selection (Fodor 2000, p. 94). Current innate beliefs in the input systems’ 
databases, according to Fodor, were previously acquired by experience. At 
some point, it turned out that those members of our species who had those 
beliefs were more likely to live long enough to reproduce. As a result, the 
holders of the right kind of innate beliefs became the majority. Eventually, 
the possession of those beliefs was fixed as an evolutionary adaptation.18
Still, nothing in the evidence Fodor cites supports his mad-dog 
representational nativism over an architectural nativism according to which 
input systems are innately disposed to produce certain representations given 
particular experiences. Fodor claims that there must be an innate database 
of input systems, but this may as well be understood as organism nativism, 
which is more architectural than representational. It is the kind of architecture 
of the mind that we have, plus the world in which we end up living, that 
together determine what ‘beliefs’ are needed for the proper functioning of 
mental modules. This does not require that concepts themselves are innate. 
Rather, it just seems irrelevant to Fodor’s argument for concept nativism. 
18 Fodor considers an example of an innate module for avoiding visual cliffs. The module 
can function properly only because it has in its database an innate and contingent belief 
that there is a contingent regularity between differences of depth in the actual world and 
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Consider also Fodor’s account of reflexes. For Fodor, reflexes are 
a good example of an innate faculty. Their innateness can be explained in 
terms of how they know what proximal stimulus to respond to and what 
proximal response to make to it. If innate knowledge of modules is supposed 
to be similar to innate knowledge of reflexes, then there seems to be no reason 
to believe that concepts are an innate element of human cognition. There is 
certainly no propositional knowledge and no thought-parts to which reflexes 
have access. Their ‘knowing,’ therefore, is not literal.
In his 1983, Fodor considers himself to be a faculty psychologist of 
the kind that holds that what is innate in human cognition are cognitive 
mechanisms of some sort. He clearly distinguishes his position from 
Chomsky, whom he classifies as an advocate of neocartesianism. 
Neocartesianism, Fodor explains, is a view according to which what is innate 
is “a certain body of information” (Fodor 1983, p. 4), or certain truths that 
“human beings innately grasp” (Fodor 1983, p. 7). This view, according to 
Fodor, is not plausible. He says: 
It may be that the development of arms and the development of anaphora 
each critically involves the exploitation of a specific genetic endowment. 
And it may also be that what is innate can, in each case, be described as 
‘information’ in the relatively uninteresting statistical sense that implies 
only nonrandomness. But there is, surely, no reason to suppose that the 
development of arms requires access to innately given propositional 
contents. There is nothing that growing arms requires one to cognize, 
innately or otherwise. (Fodor 1983, pp. 5–56)
According to Fodor, it is only the architectural kind of nativism that 
Chomsky’s views imply. Nothing suggests the need for innate concepts or 
innate representations. What we need, Fodor explains, is not some kind of 
“innately cognized rule,” but rather “a psychological mechanism—a piece 
of hardware …whose structure somehow imposes limitations upon its 
capacities” (Fodor 1983, p. 8). Fodor’s proposal against Chomsky is, 
therefore, to turn to:
a different notion of mental structure, one according to which 
a psychological faculty is par excellence a sort of mechanism. 
Neocartesians individuate faculties by reference to their typical 
propositional contents (so that, for example, the putative language organ 
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that it contains). By contrast, according to the present account, a faculty 
is individuated by reference to its typical effects, which is to say that it 
is functionally individuated. (Fodor 1983, p. 10)
A similar reasoning, I believe, could be applied to Fodor’s own 
views on the innate databases of input systems, and more generally to 
his account of concept acquisition. As we said above, the account of both 
transducers and input systems certainly requires various innate architectural 
constraints. These cognitive faculties, like reflexes, have to be programmed 
to respond in specific ways to specific stimuli. This is a constraint regarding 
how they function, and not what output they produce. It just does not make 
sense to claim that these faculties are able to do their job only because what 
they produce as their output are innate mental representations. We do not 
know how exactly the mind acquires concepts, but this mystery does not 
imply that the representations that show up as the final product of the process 
of cognition have to be innate. 
Fodor’s input systems, as we said, are supposed to be ‘computational 
mechanisms’ whose role is to produce representations of distal objects.   
And so, Fodor explains, visual input systems, for instance, are innately 
programmed to apply the right kinds of algorithms to the data that they 
receive from the visual transducers. As a result, they produce visual 
representations of distal objects. If what we want to consider is the issue 
of concept acquisition, it seems that what we need to posit are also certain 
innate mechanisms that apply the right kinds of algorithms to the data 
received and produce mental symbols representing distal objects. It is 
plausible that it is simply the functioning of our cognitive modules that is an 
evolutionary adaptation, an innate trait, fixed by natural selection because of 
its survival advantage. It is advantageous for the human species to have fast 
and automatic mechanisms, that is, input systems, which produce (usually 
in a reliable way) representations of distal objects. The representations 
themselves need not be innate.
Implications of Fodor’s Account of Concepts
Similarly, as with the case of Fodor’s views on of the architecture of the 
mind, nothing in his account of concepts as thought-parts indicates that 
he is justified in supporting his mad-dog concept nativism. In virtue of his 
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the language of thought, must be physically embodied; they must be either 
identical to or constituted by states of the brain. Each different concept must 
correspond to a distinct state of the brain, to a distinct pattern of neural 
activation that encodes it. Concepts, therefore, are patterns of neuronal 
activity; they are symbols of the brain-code. 
Given that each concept is a distinct pattern of the neural code, the only 
way to make sense of Fodor’s idea that concepts are innate in the sense of 
being already there, waiting to be triggered is, as we have seen, to accept 
neural nativism. What Fodor would need is not only the kind of tissue 
nativism which negates multiple realizability, but also the kind of nativism 
according to which it is somehow predestined, programmed in the genes, 
that a given piece of the brain-code represents a given feature of the world. 
This is what would allow Fodor to claim, no matter how implausibly, that 
we have, for instance, an innate concept RIPSTICK, because there is in our 
brain some particular symbol, some particular neural pattern, produced by 
natural selection and destined to be a RIPSTICK symbol. 
We have seen above that this is not plausible: identity between 
individual concepts and specific neural patterns in specific locations in the 
brain is not an evolutionary adaptation. What I suggest is that Fodor himself 
has no reason to support such a position. 
If Fodor accepts the definition of innateness that I propose, he would 
only need to conclude that it is innate for humans—because it is a genetically 
determined evolutionary adaptation—to have a very complex brain, with 
a huge number of neurons, and a great potential for acquiring, storing and 
modifying new connections and activation patterns. He would not need 
to say that we have an innate RIPSTICK concept, an innately determined 
symbol of brain-code. Rather, he could hold a more plausible view according 
to which we are innately disposed to enlist some or other symbol of the 
brain-code to serve as a ripstick indicator (cf. Prinz 2004, p. 230). When 
I see a ripstick for the first time, a complex cognitive process gets activated. 
My sensory organs inform me about certain colors, shapes, textures, noises, 
etc.; my memory brings up images of skateboards and surfboards, and my 
past thoughts about picking up snowboarding one day; my language faculty 
assigns a new word to the newly cognized object. A new neural pattern is 
produced in my brain. The pattern does not remain unchanged through time. 
It gets modified the better I become at riding the ripstick. It also changes 
when I alternate between riding the ripstick, rollerblading and riding a regular 162 Justyna Japola-DesVergnes
skateboard. What is innate in all this is the complex functioning of various 
cognitive mechanisms.
There is no reason why Fodor should not agree that in addition to various 
innate architectural constraints (constraints on various cognitive mechanisms, 
the structure and functioning of sensory organs, etc.), evolution also endowed 
us with general-purpose detecting and tracking abilities. Because of these 
innate abilities, new patterns of neural activation (new symbols) are produced 
in our brains when we acquire a new concept. We do not have to be born with 
pre-specified symbols of the brain-code. It is enough that we have an innate 
capacity to ‘hire’ a neural pattern in response to a given kind of stimulus. We 
are a successful species because “perceiving objects in our environment” 
gives us “the concepts that enable us to think about them, and consequently 
to form beliefs and desires about them” (Davis 2003, p. 456).
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